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Brazil has evolved a financial system with a smaller presence of public banks 
and larger participation of foreign banks, less directed credit, and well 
capitalized banks. Over the years it has been resilient to shocks and was able to 
preserve the real value of savings in the system, thus avoiding both 
dollarization and desintermediation. However, reducing the cost and increasing 
the volume of credit in the economy remains a challenge. Notwithstanding 
these hurdles, recent advances in the regulation of the financial system should 
pave the way for better intermediation and higher growth.  
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Over the past decade and a half, Brazil has had two very different financial systems. 
The first system had a strong presence of public banks (owned by both the federal and state 
governments), a limited number of foreign banks, a large role for directed credit, limited 
competition, and heavy dependence of banks’ profits on revenues associated with high 
inflation. The second system, in place today, has a small number of public banks, a strong 
presence of foreign banks, a mostly free allocation of credit, and well-capitalized banks 
whose profits do not depend on inflation. The conversion from the first to the second 
system has occurred over the last decade in the wake of a sharp shift to a more open 
economy both in terms of trade and capital flows, a deep restructuring process that 
followed the end of high inflation, and, more recently, renewed efforts to develop a set of 
regulations and procedures that strengthen the financial system (microeconomic and legal 
reforms). 
 
High inflation prior to the Real plan in 1994 provided incentives for banks to 
compete for deposits because of the profits banks earned by investing the resources in 
inflation-protected government securities. The inflation profits (from the so called “float”) 
induced banks to expand, open new branches, offer “free” bank services and develop a high 
degree of technological progress, especially aimed at enhancing the speed of processing 
financial transactions. Investments that would not be feasible in a low inflation 
environment turned out to be profitable.  
 
The end of high inflation induced a rapid revamp of the system. Banks had to find 
alternative sources of revenue. Financial institutions could not continue to offer free 
services. Consolidation was the order of the day, as offering deposits was less profitable. In 
a Darwinian process, only the most competitive and strong banks survived this major shift 
in the banking business. 
 
It is no coincidence that the major official bank restructuring programs were 
launched less than a year after the inflation stabilization in 1994. Three large private banks 




National Financial System (PROER). The end of the inflation tax and implicit government 
guarantee led also to the restructuring and privatization of banks owned by Brazil’s state 
governments under the Program of Incentives for the Reduction of the State Role in 
Banking Activity (PROES) (out of an initial 35 state-owned banks, only 12 banks remain 
under state control, of which 5 are scheduled to be privatized). 
 
The banking system still has two major federal banks – Caixa Econômica Federal 
and Banco do Brasil. Under the Program for the Strengthening of the Federal Financial 
Institutions (PROEF) these banks, along with two development banks (Banco do Nordeste 
and Banco da Amazônia), were subject to more rigorous than usual supervision by the 
Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), carried out during 1999 and 2000. This effort showed the 
need for larger provisions and adjustment for capital adequacy (stricter than those 
suggested in the Basle Accord). The objective under the program was to promote more 
competitive, transparent and efficient federal banks.  
 
The restructuring programs were followed by the creation of the FGC (Fundo 
Garantidor de Crédito) – a mandatory, privately funded deposit insurance scheme. 
Concerns about the strength of the financial system led the BCB to take actions to enhance 
the prudential regulatory and supervisory framework. In 1997 the BCB launched the Global 
Consolidated Inspection (GCI) program to enhance supervisory practices, upgrade the skills 
of supervisors, and evolve a strategic vision of the future of the financial system. It has also 
taken measures necessary to bring regulations and supervisory practices into compliance 
with the Basle Core Principles. In April 2002, the authorities put into operation a new real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system that avoids the possibility of overdrafts at 
any time. 
 
Brazil’s experience with high inflation did not give rise to a significant process of 
currency substitution. Experiences in other economies show that high and variable inflation 
rates encourage a flight from domestic money and raise demand for alternative assets, 
including those denominated in foreign currency. This paper claims that the rapid response 




actions by the government, have enabled not only the preservation of residents’ deposits 
invested in domestic assets, but also helped to ensure depositors against exogenous shocks, 
thus helping to bolster domestic households’ and firms’ confidence in domestic financial 
assets. The financial system has introduced several new financial products over time that 
have enabled households and firms to preserve the value of their assets, and the government 
in turn has played a critical role in providing the appropriate mix of public debt instruments 
that has allowed banks to frame products to protect savings against macroeconomic 
instabilities. 
 
The perception that value will be preserved also depends on confidence in the 
system. In this respect, the rapid response to and resolution of bank problems, together with 
improvements in the prudential area in the early phase of the macroeconomic stabilization 
process, helped the Brazilian economy to withstand the turbulent financial environment that 
it faced in the late 1990s, as well as more recently. Resilience to shocks provides 
confidence in the system, which allows the system to preserve the depositor base. 
 
In the new financial system, important challenges remain. Inefficiencies and 
imperfections in the system still persist, as evidenced by large bank spreads, a low volume 
of credit as a share of GDP, and almost no supply of non-government longer-term loans. 
Thus, there is room for improvements that will enable the system to properly fulfill its role 
of financial intermediation to support economic development. In this respect, further efforts 
are required in the regulatory and supervisory framework to reduce inefficiencies and make 
the system safer. In addition, there is a need for institutional reforms to minimize the costs 
of intermediation, as well as for appropriate schemes to allow the development of markets 
for new financial instruments. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the Brazilian financial 
system’s stylized facts. Section 3 describes the deep restructuring process of the Brazilian 
financial system in the second half of the 1990´s. Section 4 explains how currency 




still stand in the way of a better functioning system. Section 6 describes the recent progress 
in improving the system. And Section 7 presents concluding remarks. 
 
2.   Stylized facts of the Brazilian Financial System  
 
This section presents a set of stylized facts that characterizes the Brazilian financial 
system. The following sections will analyze these facts, providing explanations of past and 
current trends. 
 
i.  In the second half of the 1980s, the system was characterized by the strong 
presence of commercial banks, with a large number of publicly-owned banks. Since 1988, 
the number of universal banks increased rapidly, as commercial banks were converted into 
universal banks and new institutions were created. The number of financial institutions 
almost doubled – from 111 to 203 – and there was also a large increase in the number of 
branches that lasted until the launch of the Real Plan in 1994 (Table 1). Since then, this 












ii.  The ownership composition of the system has changed significantly, with the 
participation of the private sector in the system increasing from 49.1 to 66.6 percent, and 
the presence of foreign banks rising considerably (Table 2). 
                                                
1 See Central Bank of Brazil, 2000b, for a more detailed explanation on the evolution of the Brazilian 
Financial System. 
Table 1 - Banks: institutions and branches
Itemization 1988 1994
Institutions Branches Institutions Branches Institutions Branches
Commercial banks  106 13 837  28 4 160  24  380
Universal banks  0  0  173 11 305  146 14 874
Saving banks  5 2 374  2 1 935  1 1 694
Total 
1/  111 58.2  203 59.8  171 72.6
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Economic Department and authors
Note: Banco do Brasil became a universal bank in 2001






iii.  The Brazilian financial system is one of the largest among emerging market 
countries. Total assets excluding mutual funds reached R$ 1,147 billion in June 2002, 
equivalent to around 90% of GDP. The banking system, including commercial and 
universal banks and saving banks, accounts for 84% of the System’s total assets, with 
remaining assets held by development banks, credit unions, and non-banking institutions.  
 
iv.  In the last decades, there was a steady demand for financial assets denominated 
in domestic currency. Figure 1 shows the evolution of deposit share by groups of banks – 
public, private and foreign – since the launching of the Real stabilization program in 1994. 
Funds deposited in private banks have expanded, with an increasing share of deposits in 
foreign banks during the period. 
 
Table 2 - Bank ownership, total banking assets, December 1993 and June 2002
Institutions 1993  (December)
(by ownership) CR$ billion % R$ million %
Public banks 46 947 50.94 329 949 33.41
   Federal 36 189 39.27 291 137 29.48
   State 10 758 11.67 38 812 3.93
Private banks 45 213 49.06 657 674 66.59
   Domestic 37 226 40.39 357 925 36.24
   Foreign 7 987 8.67 299 749 30.35
Total 92 160  100 987 623  100
















Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Economic Department 
 
v.  As compared to other economies with a similar level of development, the 
volume of credit to GDP in Brazil is low. Nevertheless, since 1999, the volume of free, 
market-based credit has increased not only in absolute terms but also as a share of total 

























Foreign banks Private domestic banks Public banks
Table 3 - Total credit of the financial system as proportion of GDP
% of GDP
2000 2001 2002*
Free resources 14.17 16.38 17.40
   Households 4.72 5.90 6.15
   Enterprises 6.32 7.08 7.13
     Forex linked 3.12 3.40 4.11
Directed resources 12.86 9.87 10.76
   Housing 4.62 1.79 1.72
   Agricultural 2.49 2.21 2.34
   BNDES 5.25 5.53 6.60
   Others 0.51 0.33 0.11
Leasing 1.26 0.97 0.82
Public Sector 1.16 0.83 0.87
Total 29.45 28.05 29.85





vi.  Brazilian banking spreads (between borrowing and lending rates) are very wide 
but have narrowed somewhat recently (Figure 2 and Tables 4 and 5). Considering freely 
allocated resources, in September 2002, 58% of credits were fixed interest rate. Loans with 
indexed interest rates, usually rates linked to the change in the exchange rate, represent 
29.2% of the total; operations with floating interest rates account for the remainder of 
outstanding free credit.  
 
Figure 2 - Evolution of the interest rate spread and total freely allocated 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Economic Department
Table 4 - Average interest rates and spreads charged
                in loans: freely allocated resources
Deposits (% p.a.) Loans (% p.a.) Spread (p.p.)
2001 Dec 20.3 49.0 28.7
2002 Sep 13.5 43.6 30.1






vii.  Banks have performed well in terms of profitability. In June 2002, the system’s 
return on equity (ROE) stood at 9.1%, up from 5.1% in December 2001. Results have been 
better on average for foreign banks, which posted an ROE of 12.8%, compared to private 
domestic banks’ 8.2% and public banks’ 7.6%. The system’s return on total assets has also 
increased, from 0.5% in December 2001 to 0.9% on average in June 2002.
2  
 
viii.  Banks’ capital ratio has increased and exceeds standard requirements. In June 
2002, the system’s ratio of net worth to total assets weighted by risk stood at 16.1%, 
compared to the 11% level required for banks and other financial institutions by Brazilian 
regulations (Banks owned by credit unions and for credit unions have minimum ratios of 
13% and 20% respectively). The Basle ratio for the banking system was 15.6% in June 
2002, higher than the 8% level recommended internationally. Additionally, stress tests 
carried out with 137 banks and based on June 2002 data have shown the system’s resilience 
to exchange, interest rate, and credit shocks. 
                                                
2 See Central Bank of Brazil Financial Stability Report, 2002b. 
Table 5 - Interest rates and spread charged in loans: freely allocated resources
Indexed 
1/ Floating rate 
2/
Fixed rate Indexed 
1/ Floating rate 
2/
Enterprises Households
2001 Dec 43.8 71.8 25.4 28.4 39.9 4.4 9.3
2002 Sep 42.3 74.7 6.5 25.9 39.4 13.3 8.0
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Monetary Policy Press Release, October 2002.
1/ Linked to foreign exchange variation
2/ Linked to interbank deposit certificates (CDI)
Spreads (p.p.)
Fixed rate




3.  Restructuring the Financial System  
 
This section describes the restructuring process of the Brazilian financial system. 
This process produced changes in three areas: a reduction in the number of banks, a smaller  
public sector presence, and increased participation of foreign banks. This section also 
describes the resolution of the banking crisis in Brazil after the Real plan and estimates its 
fiscal costs.  
The banking system in Brazil is composed mostly of universal banks as a result of 
government policies from the late 1980s. Following the National Monetary Council’s 
(CMN) approval of Resolution 1.542 in 1988, the number of banks increased significantly, 
enhancing competition and leading to the opening of a large number of new branches 
nationwide. This trend also reflected the system’s response to the inflationary process, as 
the network of branches was used to collect seignorage revenue, especially through the 
opening of new demand deposit accounts.  
 
Since the launching of the Real Plan, the Brazilian financial system has experienced 
a deep process of restructuring. Financial environment has changed significantly with the 
macroeconomic stabilization, forcing a voluntary structural change by banks that resulted 
not only in a shift of the focus concerning profitable activities, but also in a new design of 
the market. 
 
Facing the sharp fall in seignorage soon after the launching of the Real Plan, banks 
expanded their lending to the private sector significantly in an attempt to preserve profits. 
In increasing their lending to the private sector in this period, banks were also satisfying 
strong private demand for credit that was stimulated by the more stable economic 
environment.  
 
In the early stages of the inflation stabilization program in Brazil, when the banking 
system was still adjusting to the new environment, two large banks faced serious 
difficulties that led the government to launch important programs to restructure the system. 
These programs and associated measures by the government prevented the occurrence of a 




Nevertheless, in the initial phase of the process, the smaller banks were the ones 
strongly impacted by the change in the economic environment and many experienced 
difficulties. The BCB began to intervene in banks, and a series of mergers and acquisitions 
took place (Table 6). Between June 1994 and the end of 1995, twenty-eight institutions 
were intervened by the BCB.  
 
 
Subsequently the situation worsened as two of the ten largest banks experienced 
difficulties, raising systemic problems. The government responded by putting in place the 
Program of Incentives for Restructuring and Strengthening the National Financial System 
(PROER), and measures to reinforce the BCB’s power.  
 
Furthermore, the BCB introduced measures to stimulate restructuring of the 
financial system. Mergers and acquisitions and transfers of shareholders were favored as 
the minimum capital requirement for these operations was maintained, while the 
requirement for establishing new banks was raised. To foster the normalization of financial 
market conditions, the BCB authorized banks to charge fees for financial services. 
 
Table 6 - Number of institutions liquidated, intervened in or under RAET 
1,
                and merger and acquisitons, 1994-2002
Year Institutions liquidated, intervened in or 
under RAET
Merger and acquisitons
1994   10     0  
1995   18     1  
1996   5     8  
1997   10     6  
1998   6     11  
1999   1     2  
2000   2     10  
2001   4     3  
2002*   1     5  
Total   57     46  
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Organization of the Financial System Department and Rocha, 2001
* Up to 15.10.2002




These actions increased concentration in the banking industry, especially the 
formation of large conglomerates (Figure 3). Some banks that changed the ownership have 
preserved their original names, but actually belong to a large group, and are thus under the 
same decision-making body. In analyzing the concentration process, therefore, these banks 
need to be considered as part of a single institution, as shown by Rocha (2001). 
Considering total assets, the Herfindahl-Hischman Index of concentration in terms of 
banking groups increased from 0.073 in June 1994 to 0.0812 in December 2000. The 
increase was more significant for the private sector – from 0.0392 to 0.0798 – and also in 
terms of total deposits, loans and net worth (Figure 4). 
3 
 
One should be cautious, however, in analyzing the concentration index. Although 
this measure indicates a process of concentration, it does not necessarily mean that the 
system is concentrated. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, from the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, use the Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI) of 
market concentration in their analysis. The Guidelines place the degree of concentration 
into 3 categories: unconcentrated (HHI below 0.1), moderately concentrated (HHI between 
0.1 and 0.18) and highly concentrated (HHI above 0.18). Based on these guidelines, the 
Brazilian banking system is in the limit of the unconcentrated category. Other studies, such 
as the European Central Bank (2002), show that the Brazilian Banking System is less 
concentrated than Portugal – HHI of 0.10 –, Greece (0.11), Belgium (0.15), Holland (0.17), 
and Finland (0.25). 
                                                
















Figure 4 - Hirshman-Herfindahl Index for total loans and total deposits, total 













3.1  Program of Incentives for Restructuring and Strengthening the National 
Financial System (PROER) 
 
Introduced in 1995, PROER was instituted to protect depositors by assuring the 
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system that could be costly in terms of welfare loss for the economy as a whole. Under 
PROER, the BCB intervened in the sixth and eighth largest banks in terms of net worth. 
The difficulties faced by these banks had led to a concentration of interbank market 
liquidity in several banks, as depositors reallocated their funds. If these funds were not 
redistributed appropriately among banks, the liquidity problem would have spread to the 
rest of the system. PROER ensured that depositors could claim their funds at any moment, 
and penalized bad banking practices by changing management, and by making management 
and owner assets non-disposable. The program incorporated some innovative aspects into 
the bank restructuring framework in Brazil, in particular, by requiring change in ownership 
of the institution, and making managers and owners legally and administratively 
responsible for their acts. PROER was applied 7 times. With the implementation of the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law (Complementary Law 101 of May 4, 2000), new operations 
using the PROER require specific authorization. 
 
The procedures under PROER for large banks were somewhat different from those 
applied to smaller institutions.
4 PROER established that small and medium size banks 
experiencing difficulties would be sold with PROER tasked with financing uncovered 
liabilities and providing funds to offset deposit runs. Large banks in difficulties in turn were 
split in two, the good and bad bank. The good bank would keep the good quality assets and 
all deposits of the original institution, and would be sold to a new owner. The bad bank 
would keep problem assets and liabilities and would remain under BCB intervention to be 
liquidated later. Purchasers of the good bank could apply for a special credit facility from 
the BCB to be used to cover the costs of restructuring, reorganization and modernization.  
 
The BCB’s power to deal with problem banks and to prevent crises was also 
enhanced. First, new legislation in 1995 enabled the BCB to ask problem banks for (i) new 
funding, (ii) change of control, or (iii) a restructuring of shareholding. Until then, the BCB 
was enabled to act only after the problem had emerged, thus reducing the responsibility of 
bank owners and managers. Second, legislation approved in 1996 increased the 
responsibility of auditing firms by encouraging them to inform the BCB whenever 
                                                




problems were identified, or whenever banks refused to disclose information. Also, the 
BCB had raised the minimum capital requirement for the opening of offices abroad by 
existing or new banks, while the BCB was empowered to supervise transactions carried out 
by these offices. Domestic financial institutions are required to include in their financial 
statements the operations of offices abroad to assess the compliance with the operational 
limits of the Basel Accord.  
 
3.2  Program of Incentives for the Reduction of the State Role in the Banking 
Activity (PROES) 
 
Official banks were particularly affected by the macroeconomic stabilization, as 
they had collected a large share of inflation revenue. For example, in 1993 these banks 
captured around 63% of the financial system’s 4.2% of GDP in inflation revenues. 
Moreover their management practices were influenced by local governments interests, 
which complicated their rapid adjustment to the new economic conditions. In this context, 
PROES was a program aimed at reducing state government participation in financial 
activity, and also part of a broader program of fiscal restructuring at the state level. The 
objective was to eliminate the problem of state banks’ poor finances, and these banks’ 
frequent misuse that had hampered the management of state government finances. 
 
Under PROES, depositors were protected. States applying for PROES were able to 
use a credit line to solve the bank’s balance sheet problems up to 100% of the needed funds 
if the state government decided to privatize, close, or convert the institution into a 
development agency. Otherwise, if the state decided to keep the bank, the credit line 
covered only 50% of the needed funds. Under the program, ten state banks were liquidated, 
fifteen were privatized (of which seven were transferred to the federal government for 
privatization), and four were restructured. As a result, the number of state-owned banks fell 
from 35 in August 1996 to 12 in September 2002. 
5  
 
                                                
5 By August 1996 the state owned banks comprised 27 commercial banks, 5 development banks and 3 savings 
banks. Of this, 10 were closed, 15 were in privatization programs, 4 were restructured, 3 were kept and 3 were 













3.3  Program for the Strengthening of the Federal Financial Institutions (PROEF) 
 
The process of adjustment and strengthening of federal banks – the Banco do Brasil 
(BB), Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) and Banco Meridional – started in 1995. These 
institutions had accumulated losses over time as a result of the bad quality of their loans, 
which were often granted as a result of political influence in lending decisions. The first 
phase of the adjustment process involved the recognition of these losses. The recognition of 
losses forced the Federal Treasury to execute a US$8 billion recapitalization of BB. CEF 
was in turn a more complex case as it held housing loans. 
 
The second phase involved a more rigorous than usual supervision effort. The 
supervision exercise, carried out by the BCB in 1999 and 2000, indicated the need for 
larger provisions. The exercise led to the creation of a special program – the Program for 
the Strengthening of the Federal Financial Institutions (PROEF) – in June 2001. The 
PROEF’s basic objective was the adjustment of capital adequacy of the four public banks: 
the BB, CEF and two development banks – Banco do Nordeste and Banco da Amazônia. 
Under the program, the Government policy objective was to make these banks more 
competitive, transparent and efficient, as reflected in the actions already taken and in the 
objectives of the Consolidated General Inspection. As a result of this process, the federal 
banks are now required to comply with capital requirements stricter than those 
recommended in the Basle Accord.  
 
Situation of the banks Number of institutions
Liquidated  10
Privatized  15
    in process  5
Restructured 4
Development agencies authorized 16




The PROEF framework involved three actions: (i) the transfer of credit risks to the 
Treasury or a Special Purpose Company (Emgea); (ii) exchange of assets with low liquidity 
and low interest rates for more liquid instruments paying market interest rates; and (iii) a 
capital increase in three of these four banks. The Emgea was in turn tasked with managing 
credits transferred from federal banks to the Treasury. The program represented an addition 
of R$12.18 billion to the Treasury debt and R$ 62.4 billion of bonds issued.  
 
3.4  The fiscal cost of the banking crisis in Brazil 
 
In the last two decades, banking crises – defined as a concentrated number of bank 
failures – have occurred in many countries, with large impacts on the fiscal accounts and 
economic activity. In this section, we estimate the fiscal cost of bank restructuring in Brazil 
taking into account the impact on the Net Public Sector Debt, i.e., the additional new 
issuance of bonds needed in the year the events took place. The estimate under this 
procedure is still preliminary as the BCB and Treasury are still collecting revenues from the 
outstanding loans provided by PROER and PROES. Using this methodology, the fiscal 
impact of the PROER was 0.88% of GDP until June 2002. The cost of PROES reached 
5.68% of GDP based on bonds issued minus privatization revenues. For PROEF, the net 
debt was increased by 2.09% of GDP. The fiscal cost of the three programs together 
amounted to approximately 8-9% of GDP. 
 
The cost of the Brazilian restructuring programs was relatively low as compared to 
other countries. In a sample of 40 countries, Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) found that the 
average fiscal cost of bank restructuring was 12.8% of GDP. For developing countries, the 
cost was even higher, reaching 14.3% of GDP – in the range of 20% to 55% of GDP in the 
cases of East Asia. Estimates by Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002) for the fiscal and quasi 
fiscal costs of banking crises amounted to 12.1% of GDP on average for high income 
countries and 17.6% for medium and low income countries (Table 8). Boyd and Smith 





















3.5  Increasing the presence of foreign banks 
 
In 1995, the government allowed foreign participation in the privatization of the 
banking sector for the first time and then widened the scope of foreign participation by 
allowing foreign bank entry into the domestic market irrespective of the privatization 
process. Foreign banks entered the Brazilian market by acquiring domestic banks through 
the privatization process (PROER) and also through normal mergers and acquisitions. As 
observed in other emerging market economies, the participation of foreign banks has 
increased in recent years, helping to stimulate competition and consolidation in the 
domestic system. 
 
The main argument for opening the banking industry was to improve competition 
by increasing the supply of products and services, thus producing more efficiency and cost 
reduction. Another benefit would be the transfer of more advanced technology in terms of 
credit operations and risk evaluation, which would help to reduce bank spreads. All these 
Country Period Fiscal and quasi-fiscal
costs/GDP





Brazil 1994-1996  5 - 10 (8,6*)
Chile 1981-1983 41,2
Colombia 1982-1987 5,0







Medium and Low Income Countries (average) 17,6
Source: Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta, 2002
1/ Average costs from: Finland. Japan, Korea, Norway, Spain, Sweden and  United




factors would contribute to improved efficiency and soundness, and therefore make the 
banking sector more resilient to adverse shocks. In fact, competition has been stimulated by 
increased foreign participation in the domestic market. The opening of the market to – and 
increasing share of – foreign banks can be evaluated in terms of inflows of foreign direct 
investment into the sector that have amounted to US$19.8 billion, or 15 percent of total 
FDI, over the past seven years. This tendency can also be noted as foreign banks have 
captured an increasing share of assets and deposits, as shown above in figure 1 and table 2. 
 
4.  The role of the financial system in preserving the real value of private savings  
 
One of the financial system’s key roles is to provide financial services to households 
and firms (for example, allowing intertemporal smoothing of consumption and 
expenditures). The issue we examine in this section is whether the financial system in 
Brazil has fulfilled this objective. We conclude that Brazilian financial system has been 
able to provide firms and households with safe liquid financial instruments, and to carry 
purchasing power forward in time, so that money has remained mostly at home.  
 
Brazil´s economic history has helped to shape its financial system structure and 
characteristics. High volatility of the main macroeconomic variables – high inflation prior 
to the Real plan and, subsequently, high volatility in real interest rates and, with the floating 
exchange regime, also in exchange rates – has led to a system resilient to shocks. In fact, in 
the period after the launching of the Real Plan, the Brazilian economy faced a sequence of 
exogenous shocks, but the financial system was able to preserve its investor and depositor 






An economy with a healthy and well-developed financial market is, in principle, 
capable of adapting rapidly to a high inflation environment by offering a broad set of fairly 
liquid, high-yield instruments denominated in domestic currency (“quasi-monies”) that 
preserve the real value of firms’ and households’ portfolios. In contrast, a “financially 
repressed” economy undergoing high inflation generally offers domestic residents few 
options other than to seek protection in foreign currency denominated assets and 
instruments.  
 
In general, the financial and institutional frameworks of an economy determine 
whether the flight from domestic money results in a rapid and sizable process of currency 
substitution. The relative importance of foreign currency to hedge against inflation will be 
inversely related to the economy’s level of financial development. Depositors need to be 
assured that the real value of their financial assets will be preserved, as well as that 
domestic financial assets are safe instruments. This would require a sound financial system 
and confidence that, for example, those assets would not be frozen or unilaterally 
restructured by the government.  
 
We claim that the rapid response by the Brazilian financial system to a changing 
and turbulent environment, plus actions by the government, have not only preserved the 
value of residents’ deposits invested in domestic assets, but also helped to insure them 
against exogenous shocks. These protections have helped to reinforce domestic households’ 
and firms’ confidence in domestic financial assets. Over time, the financial system has 
introduced new financial products to preserve the value of households’ and firms’ assets. 
Table 9 - Financial savings as proportion of GDP, 1995-2002
% GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 July
Mutual Funds  11.6  16.3  16.2  17.1  24.2  28.2  30.2  27.6
Savings Accounts  9.8  9.2  11.1  11.8  11.5  10.3  10.0  10.6
Time Deposits  12.6  10.3  10.0  9.7  9.8  8.3  9.1  10.2
Total  34.0  35.8  37.3  38.5  45.6  46.8  49.3  48.4




  The government, in turn, has had a critical role in providing the mix of public debt 
instruments that banks needed in order to frame products to protect savings against 
macroeconomic instabilities. The government benefited as it was able to finance itself 
domestically through a variety of indexed instruments in the period of high inflation and 
especially when external financing – both to the sovereign and the private sector – was 
closed for Brazil during the period in which the country was in arrears on its external debt.  
 
Brazil has experienced several episodes of high inflation, but these not give rise to a 
significant process of currency substitution (see Bevilaqua & Garcia, 1999). Experiences in 
other economies show that high and variable inflation rates encourage a flight from 
domestic money and raise demand for alternative assets, including those denominated in 
foreign currency.  
 
Figure 5 - Inflation path, Consumer Price Index (IPCA), 












Sudden outbursts of inflation do not generally lead to a massive flight from the 
domestic money, nor do protracted periods of high inflation erode at the same time or pace 
the three basic functions of the national currency – store of value, unit of account and 
medium of exchange. Instead, the flight from money in high inflation countries tends to be 
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Economic Department




of-value function is typically the first to go, but it usually takes a prolonged period of high 
inflation – or a hyperinflationary burst – before the domestic money starts losing its roles as 
a unit of account and, especially, as a medium of exchange (Calvo & Végh, 1992). 
 
Although, banks were able to manage rather complex indexation arrangements and 
thus preserve the value of local currency assets during the years of hyperinflation, the 
Brazilian banking system is still adjusting to a more competitive market environment. 
Table 10 shows how the composition of corporate and household holdings of government 
securities has evolved from 1991-2002. This evolution essentially reflects the 
macroeconomic circumstances faced by economic agents. Contrary to some other high 
inflation countries in Latin America, Brazil was never a dollarized economy. Indeed, 
despite a series of failed stabilization plans – involving six monetary reforms in ten years – 
GDP growth in Brazil suffered relatively less damage than one would expect for an 
economy experiencing such a chronic high inflation process, though potential GDP growth 
had been hampered and all sorts of distortions developed. Indexation, the adaptive policy 
response, became pervasive throughout the economy and its capacity to accommodate 
inflation may perhaps partially explain Brazil’s failure to engage in serious structural 














Table 10: Composition of the Domestic Public Sector Debt (Marketable), held by private sector
by remuneration
% of total 
Year Fixed rate Selic
 1/
Price index linked Forex linked Others
1991 16.06 67.17 5.30 11.47 0.01
1992 54.80 9.04 23.56 3.00 9.60
1993 26.41 3.78 42.08 17.26 10.47
1994 40.20 16.03 12.51 8.29 22.96
1995 42.70 37.77 5.26 5.28 8.98
1996 61.00 18.61 1.75 9.38 9.26
1997 40.91 34.78 0.34 15.36 8.61
1998 1.68 70.98 0.37 20.91 6.07
1999 9.19 61.09 2.37 24.23 3.11
2000 15.34 52.36 5.87 21.70 4.74
2001 7.21 53.76 7.08 28.11 3.84
2002* 10.95 52.22 8.72 26.35 1.76
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Economic Department 
* September




The dollarization process, defined as currency substitution (or dollarization of 
narrow money), or dollarization of less liquid assets such as time deposits (Catão and 
Terrones – 2000), has not occurred in Brazil. Use of foreign currencies for domestic 
purposes has been negligible. Domestic use of foreign currencies is not allowed in Brazil; 
but even informally such practices have been very limited. Usually, firms and households 
look for financial assets with the appropriate indexation that will preserve real value. 
Therefore, the most usual movement in the Brazilian financial system has been the 
allocation of funds among modalities of financial assets, due to differences in returns, or 
migration of deposits between banks, due to differences in confidence. 
 
The dollarization of less liquid assets has not occurred either. Ize and Yeyati (1998) 
estimated the actual dollarization for some countries taking the average of total dollar 
deposits to total domestic and cross-border deposits for the period 1990-1996. The ratio for 
Brazil was 11.6% at the end of 1996 (Table 11). This figure can be compared with the ratio 
of 1.46 percent of Brazilian residents’ deposits abroad in December 2001 – the result of the 
BCB survey on Brazilian Capital Abroad – to total domestic deposits plus deposits abroad. 






















Brazil 11,6 (1,5 - 7,4*) 
Israel 18.2
Source: Ize, Alain and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, 1998
Note: Actual dollarization ratio is obtained as an average of total dollar deposits over 
total domestic and cross-border deposits for the period




Most banks have shown a strong preference for holding government securities, as 
well as short-term interbank placements. The preference for government securities is 
explained by their high liquidity and the fact that their rate of return adjusted for risk has 
been maintained at appropriate levels. Typically, the sum of these two categories of earning 
assets has been comparable to loans. For the banking system, securities and interbank 
placements make up a high 37 percent of total assets. 
 
Innovations in telecommunications and computing were another factor contributing 
to the Brazilian financial system’s ability to build a network of financial services to protect 
their customers from inflation. Also, as mentioned, direct official intervention was also 
required to ensure a sound banking system through restructuring banks, reinforcing 
prudential supervision and regulation. In the early phase of the stabilization program, some 
measures of a prudential nature were implemented, such as controls on capital inflows and 
an increase in reserve requirements to offset, on the external front, easy credit conditions in 
the international financial markets and, domestically, the exuberance of the wealth effect 
resulting from the sharp fall in inflation. 
 
In a context of high uncertainty, the financial sector has fulfilled the role of 
intertemporal risk sharing; but much needs to be done in terms of its intratemporal 
allocation of risk function through intermediation. With the acceleration of inflation in the 
mid-1980s, indexation intervals became shorter and an increasing share of deposits was 
held in accounts linked to the daily behavior of overnight interest rates. Traditionally, 
private banks have restricted their private sector lending to short-term, self-liquidating 
commercial transactions. Medium- and long tem finance to industry and agriculture has 
mainly been provided by specialized federally owned institutions and development funds. 
The Brazilian banking sector, therefore, is not yet playing as full a role as it could in 
financial intermediation. Instead of intermediating credits to the private sector, banks have 
mainly engaged in short-term treasury operations. As a result, enterprises and households in 





Brazil has also built a fairly sophisticated payment system motivated by the need to 
cope with high inflation rates (Listfield and Montes-Negret, 1996). This development was 
partly a result of the need to create alternative, quasi-money indexed financial assets before 
the launching of the Real Plan. During the high inflation period, the Brazilian payment 
system achieved a high degree of technological progress, especially aimed at enhancing the 
speed of processing financial transactions. Investments that would not be feasible in a low 
inflation environment turned out to be profitable. Costs were not incurred directly by the 
clients but rather compensated by float yields from inflation, which boosted the 
technological advances. The search for lowering the exposure of money balances to the 
effects of high inflation, for instance, motivated the widespread use of automation in check 
clearing. In other words, technology and human capital in banking, which are a legacy of 
the inflationary environment, were “positive” externalities to the further development of the 
payment system.  
 
Furthermore, the external debt crisis in the early 1980s was crucial for the 
automation of foreign exchange transactions. The need to pursue a tight control of the cash 
flow in foreign currencies by the BCB encouraged the development of the settlement 
process, including the introduction of electronic inputs in the domestic currency leg of 
foreign exchange transactions in substitution for inputs via Telex.  
 
The Brazilian financial system has weathered well the difficult economic 
environment in the process of adjustments – domestic and external – observed in the 
stabilization program. The exchange rate devaluation of January 1999, for instance, seems 
to have been anticipated by most financial institutions, which had reduced or hedged their 
external exposures. The relatively high share of government securities and interbank 
placements in banks’ portfolios proved important in 1998 and the 1999, as many foreign 
banks withdrew credit lines to Brazilian financial institutions. By virtue of the large 
holdings of liquid, dollar indexed government securities, most banks were able to meet the 
withdrawal without suffering severe liquidity problems, and without having to call on the 





5.  Challenges to promote growth 
 
Although financial institutions in Brazil have been efficient in preserving the value 
of financial assets, they have been struggling to perform the role of intermediating savings 
for investment. This section analyzes the relationship between growth and the development 
of the financial system in Brazil.  
 
A fundamental role of the financial system is to channel household savings to the 
corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms. In Brazil, both macro and 
microeconomic factors, which are reflected in high bank spreads and low credit to the 
private sector, have acted as constraints on the financial sector providing longer-term 
loans.
6 As compared to the average of upper middle-income countries, the volume of credit 
to GDP is relatively low in Brazil. Firms have relied on self-financing, or on long-term 
credits from official agencies.  
 
Levine’s (1996) survey of the literature on finance and development concludes that 
“the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive, 
first-order relationship between financial development and economic growth”; but – as he 
noted – this must be stated hesitantly and with ample qualifications. A growing body of 
empirical analyses, including firm-level, industry-level and individual country studies, and 
broad cross-country comparisons, demonstrate a strong positive link between the 
functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth – that the financial 
system contributes to growth. Theory and evidence in turn make it difficult to conclude the 
opposite that the financial system merely – and automatically – responds to 
industrialization and economic activity, or that financial development is an inconsequential 
addendum to the process of economic growth. 
 
On conceptual grounds, the role of financial institutions, markets and instruments in 
an economy is associated with the need to mitigate the effects of information and 
transactions costs. These costs may inhibit liquidity and intensify liquidity risk. Liquidity is 
                                                




defined as the ease and speed with which economic agents can convert assets into 
purchasing power at agreed prices; and liquidity risk arises due to uncertainties associated 
with converting assets into a medium of exchange. Liquid capital markets are markets 
where it is relatively inexpensive to trade financial instruments and where there is little 
uncertainty about the timing and settlement of those trades. Informational asymmetries and 
transactions costs, therefore, create incentives for the emergence of financial markets and 
institutions that augment liquidity.  
 
The link between liquidity and economic development arises because some high-
return projects require a long-run commitment of capital, but savers do not like to 
relinquish control of their savings for long periods. Thus, if the financial system does not 
augment the liquidity of long-term investment, less investment is likely to occur in the 
high-return projects. With liquid capital markets, savers can hold liquid assets that they can 
quickly and easily sell if they seek access to their savings. Simultaneously, capital markets 
transform these liquid financial instruments into long-term capital investments. By 
providing demand deposits and choosing an appropriate mixture of liquid and illiquid 
investments, banks provide complete insurance to savers against liquidity risk while 
simultaneously facilitating long-run investments in high return projects. 
 
Thus the financial system facilitates the trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling 
of risk; allocates resources; monitors managers and exerts corporate control; mobilizes 
savings; and eases the trading of goods, services, and financial contracts. Banks, mutual 
funds, and securities markets all provide vehicles for trading, pooling, and diversifying risk. 
The financial system’s ability to provide risk diversification services can affect long-run 
economic growth by altering resource allocation and saving rates.  
 
In the case of Brazil, we are particularly interested in the financial system’s function 
of facilitating the management of liquidity and idiosyncratic risks. These concerns are 
related to the environment of high inflation and volatile nominal variables – especially 




 Empirical tests show that the maintenance of residents’ deposits in the Brazilian 
financial system during the period of high inflation and external shocks was an important 
element in preserving GDP growth even in extreme circumstances. Carneiro de Matos 
(2002) tested the causality between financial development (D) and economic growth (Y) by 
adopting the following specification: 
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where U and V are error-correcting terms; k and m, lags of Y and D respectively. 
 
Carneiro de Matos shows that GDP growth is affected positively by credit to the 
private sector (1964-2000) and the extent to which residents are willing to maintain their 
assets in the domestic financial system. He used other parameters but the results were 
weaker. Using, among other parameters, the ratio of residents’ funds deposited in the 
financial system to M2 (1947-2000) as a proxy of financial development, empirical tests 
support the view that it is important to preserve the public’s confidence in domestic 
financial assets to improve GDP growth prospects. This ratio may reflect an intangible asset 
of the financial intermediaries, i.e. the general public’s confidence that contracts between 
customers and these intermediaries would be respected and protected. As long as deposits 
are maintained in the domestic system, the possibility of financial activities to develop 
domestically increases. Brazil had experienced changes of inflation indexes, forced 
lengthening of deposit maturities, banking failures, inflation and unstable macroeconomic 
policies, among other factors, which hampered somewhat households’ and firms’ 
confidence in the system. Economic agents have thus become more risk averse regarding 
investments in domestic assets, which may be reflected in the high interest rates and 
shorter-maturities prevailing in the economy.  
 
Carneiro de Matos applied capital accumulation and macroeconomic instability as 




second, the volatility of the monthly inflation rate. The empirical tests suggested, as a 
general result, that the causality is from financial development to economic growth. The 
variable “asset held by public in the system” indicated that financial development affects 
output per capita at the 5 percent level of significance for the null hypothesis of no causality 
between variables. If controlled by capital stock to worker and macroeconomic instability, 
the level of significance was reduced to 2.5 percent. The feedback hypothesis that GDP per 
capita causes the financial variable was rejected. Regarding the ratio of credit to the private 
sector to GDP, the null hypothesis was rejected at the 2.5 percent level of significance, and 
when controlled by capital stock and macroeconomic instability, the level of significance 
fell to 1 percent. The reverse causality, however, indicated a level of significance of 10 
percent when the control variables were applied.  
 
Another feature of the Brazilian financial system has been enterprises’ reliance on 
self-financing, particularly for small and medium sized firms, which have often lacked 
access to credit markets. The generally high real interest rates prevailing in the country for 
many years now, as well as two decades of high and variable inflation that preceded the 
introduction of the Real Plan in mid-1994, encouraged Brazilian enterprises to reduce their 
reliance on debt financing and to rely more on retained earnings. As a result, Brazilian 
companies entered the 1990s with balance sheets that looked fairly underdeveloped when 
compared to companies in other countries. There is thus room for further gains to expand 
credit to the private sector, but the extent to which credit could be expanded requires 
careful consideration. As Allen and Gale (2000) note, for most developed countries internal 
finance dominates external finance, while in a range of emerging countries, external finance 
is more important. There seems to be, hence, no clear indication of what an appropriate 
level of credit to GDP would be, with this ratio instead possibly depending on the 
characteristics of each economy. 
 
Private investments have been primarily financed by long-term credits from official 
agencies, especially from the national investment bank (BNDES). Brazilian enterprises’ 




balance sheets show a fairly large position in real assets (such as real estate) that were used 
to hedge against inflation instead of in the production process.  
 
The disinflation brought about by the Real Plan has led to considerable corporate 
restructuring. This entailed two complementary strategies: reducing debt by liquidating 
unproductive (real) assets; and replacing expensive short-term bank debt with medium-term 
capital raised in either local, or increasingly, international capital markets.  
 
Despite these restructurings that have taken place over the past few years, the level 
of indebtedness of Brazilian non-financial enterprises is still low compared with other Latin 
American countries. Although the advent of low inflation under the Real Plan in and of 
itself probably encouraged an increase in the supply of loanable funds, the demand for 
borrowing has been discouraged by the high real interest rates that have prevailed over the 
last several years due especially to the turbulent external environment. At the same time, in 
view of fiscal imbalances, lending to the private sector has also stagnated over the last 
several years, suggesting a classical case of crowding out.  
 
The largest domestic enterprises and the multinational firms operating in Brazil 
have access to external markets as alternative sources of financing. Most firms with foreign 
currency liabilities either had a natural hedge in the form of foreign currency receivables, or 
hedged themselves in other ways, for example by acquiring U.S. dollar-indexed 
government securities. Those few enterprises that were unhedged or only partially hedged 
are typically the Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign conglomerates that may be assumed to 
provide sufficient financial backing. 
 
The consequence of the relatively low gearing of Brazilian companies and their 
limited exposure to foreign currency risk is that the non-financial corporate sector was not 
seriously affected by the depreciation of the Real in recent years, nor by the continuing 
relatively high level of interest rates. For industries and firms that rely heavily on external 
financing, growth is faster in countries with well-developed banks and securities markets 




process of liberalizing the financial markets in Brazil, prudent expansion of credit to the 
private sector, requires further efforts in terms of macroeconomic stability and institutional 
reforms. 
 
6.  Recent progress to strengthen the Brazilian Financial System 
 
In order to reduce high lending rates, interest margins and overhead costs, and low 
levels of credit as a proportion of GDP further progress is needed. This section describes 
the recent effort to strengthen the Brazilian financial system. 
 
The major impediments to the development of more active medium- and long-term 
lending operations by the private banking sector are uncertain macroeconomic 
environment, notably high and volatile real interest rates, and crowding-out by the public 
sector’s financing needs, at both federal and state levels. A continued commitment to a 
policy consistent with low inflation as followed since the launching of the Real Plan in 
1994 is an important element. It is fundamental to persevere in the fiscal adjustment to 
enhance the credibility of macroeconomic policies, which would contribute to a sustainable 
reduction of interest rates. Improved fiscal performance and better management of the 
public debt is expected to create incentives for financing the private sector.  
 
Co-ordination of macroeconomic policies has already led to substantially lower real 
interest rates. But other reforms are needed to reduce spreads in the economy. The cost of 
financial transactions needs to be reduced by reforming the tax system.  
 
Since 1999, the BCB has been working towards the reduction of the interest rate 
spreads of domestic credit operations to a pattern more consistent with similar economies.
7 
It has followed – whenever economic conditions allow – a policy of gradual reduction of 
reserve requirements and cuts in the financial market tax rate. Reducing reserve 
                                                
7 A specific annual report is published by Central Bank of Brazil presenting analysis on the development of 
loans and banking interest rates and spreads, as well as research papers on this field (Banking Interest Rates 
and Spreads in Brazil, 1999, Banking Interest Rate and Spreads in Brazil - Evaluation of 1 year of the Project, 




requirements and directed credit could reduce bank spreads and net margin. Until the 
beginning of 2001, banking interest rates had been showing a downward trend, with more 
credit being offered, longer tenors and reduced default levels. Since early 2001 however, 
these trends reversed, due to the Argentine crisis, energy rationing, and the deceleration in 
the U.S. and world economies, with the consequent increase in the Over-Selic rate and the 
devaluation of the exchange rate. These effects are probably temporary and the outlook 
points to spreads returning to their downward trend as soon as the uncertainties are reduced. 
The volume of credit, on the other hand, remains on an upward trend, although at a slower 
pace. The segment of freely allocated resources in the past 12 months performed 
consistently with the change in the macroeconomic scenario observed in the Brazilian 
economy.  
 
6.1  Interest rates and spreads in Brazil: Recent Studies 
 
Despite the trend observed recently, bank spreads remain high by international 
standards. Part of the explanation for these spreads may be a certain degree of hysteresis in 
the system may. As mentioned, for many years, Brazilian banks had focused on treasury 
operations. The assets sold to clients as protection against inflation had to be very liquid, as 
they were cash substitutes. Even with indexation, a volatile inflation rate made 
intermediation very risky. To compensate this risk, private banks resorted to extremely high 
spreads in their lending interest rates, as well as very high levels of collateral. In addition, 
bank interest rates have presented high and persistent dispersion across banks. These 
elements displace a market where productive inefficiencies and regulatory constraints give 
room for some banks to operate even charging much higher interest rates than their 
competitors.  
 
With inflation under control and a more stable macroeconomic environment, there 
has been a notable trend towards a more balanced credit market, with a vigorous fall in 
bank interest margins and an increase in credit to the private sector. Since 1995, interest 
                                                                                                                                               
report take a broader form: The Economics of Banking and Credit - Evaluation of 3 years of the Project 




spreads have been in a downward trend. The overall interest spread has fallen from an 
annual rate as high as 135 percent in 1995 to 35 percent in 2001 (Figure 2). 
 
The estimates for the composition of banking spreads are: default expenses (15.8% 
of the spread), administrative costs (19.2%), indirect taxes (8.2%), direct taxes (21%) and 
bank net margins (35.7%) (Figure 6). 
 













The results of econometric tests indicate that 45% of the behavior of banking 
spreads is due to risk perception. Other factors are the Selic rate (16% of the spread), 
administrative costs (20%) and indirect taxes (19%) (Figure 7).  



























Some measures taken by the BCB since October 1999 have, along with a favorable 
environment, helped to gradually reduce banking spreads. In 2001, however, uncertainties 
resulting from domestic and external adverse shocks led the spreads to return to levels 
observed in January 2000. Based on such developments, Koyama and Nakane (2002a) 
investigated the existence of cyclical and inertial (persistent) components in the 
composition of spread time applying the ARFIMA
8 model. The following equation was 
estimated to express the relationship among the variables: 
 




spreadt is the ratio of (1+) the interest rate of the lending operations in the freely 
allocated resources segment and (1+) the rate on the funding (30-day CDB), both monthly; 
Tendt  is a deterministic trend, to control the effect of other variables such as 
inflation rate and economic activity level on spread; 
selict    is (1+) the average daily rate of Selic operations expressed monthly;  
admt   is (1+) the proportion of administrative costs in the volume of credit; 
                                                
8 Autoregressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average 













riskt   is (1+) the yield of C-Bond over the U.S. Treasury yield with same maturity, 
monthly expressed;  
impt   is (1+) the indirect taxes quote, representing the weight of IOF, PIS, Cofins 
and CPMF in a 1-month loan funded through a 30-day CDB. 
 
The econometric exercise indicated that the banking spread series has a “long 
memory.” Figure 8 shows the behavior of the spread decomposed into cyclical and 
persistent components. After May 2000, the persistence component was below the spread 
series, while the cyclical component contributed significantly to the widening of spread. 
The historical analysis of the trend shows that the banking spread may be brought to its 
persistence component as soon as the macroeconomic environment becomes smoother, 
reversing the decoupling observed since May 2000. The persistence corresponds to a 
relationship between observations in time t and in lags of k (t-k).  
 
Figure 8 - Spread Composition - Cyclical and Persistent Factors 
 










Afanasieff, Lhacer e Nakane (2002) applied the two-step approach based on an 
adaptation of a model of bid-ask prices of securities dealers to the determination of banking 
spreads. The objective was to decompose the main determinants of the interest spread into 
microeconomic variables – inefficiencies or lack of competition of the sector, for example – 

































Their empirical exercise using panel data from 142 banks for the period February 
1997 to November 2000 showed the relevance of the macroeconomic conditions on bank’s 
observable characteristics as the main determinants of bank interest spreads in Brazil. Some 
unidentified factors, however, still account for a large part of the behavior of spreads. It is 
thus unclear whether further reductions could be achieved with improvements in 
macroeconomic conditions only. Given the nature of the cross-sectional dispersion, spreads 
seem to be more affected by changes in microeconomic environment that touch upon 
industry structure and modify the behavior of banks to improve managerial practices. For 
the BCB’s policy, the conclusion is that priority should now be focused on improvements 
in prudential regulation and supervision instruments as the most effective instrument to 
ensure the convergence of local banks toward international best practices.  
  
Cardoso (2002) in turn shows the effect of seignorage on banking spreads. In all 
regressions, bank seignorage revenue has the expected negative sign and is significant: an 
increase in seignorage collected by commercial banks reduces the spread. Bank seignorage 
revenue would depend on the interaction between inflation, the market for demand 
deposits, and the rate of reserve requirements imposed by the BCB. Intermediation costs 
usually rise with inflation because of the following reasons: inflation shortens the maturity 
of contracts and thus requires more frequent interest rate transactions per unit of assets. 
Chronic inflation leads to an expansion of the branch network as banks compete for low 
cost deposits by offering more services and branches. Lower inflation would increase 
operational cost relative to banks’ income, but this effect appears to be smaller than the 
response to other variables, such as explicit taxes on financial intermediation and the costs 
of provisioning for non-performing loans.  
 
The author also noted that the modest credit to GDP (28 percent in 2001) cannot be 
attributed to the lack of sophisticated credit analysis or lending capacity but from high 
interest rates, high reserve requirements, and government-directed lending. High levels of 
taxation and the costs of non-performing loans also affect bank spreads between interest 




explicit taxation on financial intermediaries became more important for the explanation of 
the behavior of bank spreads than reserve requirements and bank seignorage revenue. 
 
Empirical evidence indicates that financial liberalization – i.e., elimination of credit 
controls, deregulation of interest rates, private ownership of banks, free entry into the 
banking sector, freely flowing international capital, and bank autonomy over internal 
governance procedures under good regulation and supervision – may promote both 
financial deepening and a more efficient allocation of investment.  
 
6.2  Microeconomic and structural reforms 
 
There are also important microeconomic reasons for the low level of financial 
intermediation. The BCB has been taking measures to reduce interest rates and banking 




To foster competition and the culture of credit, the BCB has been aiming at 
disseminating and improving the quality of information. In this regard, when the project of 
the Payment System was released, the BCB started to disclose on its website basic 
information on interest rates charged by financial institutions. It also responded to demands 
for quality and detail of this information. The Accounting Statements of Financial 
Institutions (Cosif) was revised in order to adjust its accounting reporting standards to 
international patterns, amplifying its transparency.  
 
To boost competition and to strengthen customers' power, since last April, more 
detailed information on the overdraft account was reinforced. The financial institutions are 
obliged to give to their customers information filed over the past two years, including 
personal data, historical credit and financing operations, and average monthly balance in 
the current accounts and in the other types of investment. Aiming at improving 




information about the financial fees on overdrafts, even in the monthly statements free of 
charge, comprising the period considered for the charge, the effective interest rate, and the 
amounts charged each month. 
  
Among measures adopted to reduce costs of financial intermediation, the BCB 
introduced a Credit Risk Data Center (“Central de Risco de Crédito”) in 1997. This Center 
functions to provide information on the quality of loans to individuals and economic 
groups, which is becoming an effective tool to improve credit portfolio monitoring for both 
the BCB and individual banks.  
 
The credit risk system is used to measure the overall exposure of the banking 
system to any one borrower, with differences in the details that are required for the 
reporting of large exposures. All bank financing (loan, leasing operation, advance, 
guarantees given, or losses on such operations) that exceeds R$ 5,000 (equivalent to 
US$1,700 as of mid 2002) and any collateral attached to such financing must be reported 
monthly, loan by loan, classified by entity exercising ultimate economic control over the 
borrower. Information provided by the system includes debts forgiven, collateral protection 
and internal loan grading information. The BCB has devoted considerable effort to ensuring 
that banks are accurately filing borrower information in the system. Banks have been able 
to incorporate information from the risk bureau into credit scoring models for use in 
evaluating prospective borrowers. The high utility of the system stems from the fact that 
most borrowers have loans with more than one bank.  
 
The information provided for the Credit Risk Data Center was widened. The data 
gathered on this center now includes information on good performance, and financial 
institutions may access them to analyze credit profile. A detailed revision is under progress, 
to be finalized by November 2002, with support of market experts and international 
consultancies, with high investment in information technology. The BCB is preparing a 
comprehensive text about the Credit Risk Data Center, explaining how it works and 
detailing its effects on lending interest rates. The inclusion of a specific page on the BCB's 




New Payment System 
 
An important project is the launch of the new Payment System in June 2002.
9 The 
core features of the new payment system are: (1) clear definition of the role of the BCB in 
the payment system and establishment of a well-founded legal basis to allow better risk 
control devices; (2) setting up of a large-value fund transfer system at the BCB, operating 
under a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) mode and a real time monitoring of banks’ 
reserve account balances to avoid the possibility of overdrafts at any time; (3) enabling 
clearing houses to assume certainty of settlement through the establishment of proper 
safeguard mechanisms; and (4) clear definition of all the risks involved in every stage of 
the pre-settlement and settlement process. The restructuring of the system was carried 
mainly to address two concerns: the episodes of overdrafts on Banks’ reserve accounts and 
systemic risk issues. 
 
Credit Risks: Legal Improvements 
 
Imperfections of the legal system are likely to be an important bar to developing 
credit markets (OECD, 2001). Although difficult to quantify, the lack of effective 
bankruptcy procedure and secured credits is an important contributor to the cost of financial 
intermediation. Even secured lending is rather problematic as, under existing commercial 
legislation, enforcing claims on collateral is difficult given the debt’s lack of seniority to 
federal, state, and local authorities as well as to employees. This situation has been further 
aggravated by moral hazard, arising from a bias towards borrower protection where 
disputes arise.  
 
                                                
9  See Central Bank of Brazil, 2002a and 2002e, Investor Relations Group reports on the restructuring of the 




To reduce the legal risks in credit operations, the BCB is working towards 
authorizing more adequate financial instruments, fostering improvement in the guarantees 
of operations, and the minimization of losses in cases of insolvency. In October 1999, the 
Banking Credit Note was created, a credit instrument with quicker and easier transit 
through the Judiciary system, and the liquidity of the credits supported by this note was 
increased in March 2001. The coverage of chattel mortgage as a guarantee was widened 
and now includes securities and other credit instruments, in addition to goods and real 
estate. It gives room to more credit operations with thus type of guarantee, which has 
historically had lower interest rates and banking spreads. 
 
Additionally, the netting of obligations in derivative instruments was permitted. 
Provisional Measure n. 2,192 contemplates the possibility of agreements to net obligations. 
The netting is therefore not affected by insolvency, creditor's agreement, bankruptcy, 
intervention or liquidation: after the netting, if there is a positive balance in favor of the 
insolvent party, it will be transferred in order to be part of the bankruptcy; if the balance is 
negative, it becomes a credit against the insolvent party. The target of this rule is the set of 
hedging operations disseminated in the past years and that must be protected in default 
situations, and liquidated by difference. The better protection these operations may have, 
the lower the risk, and the lower the interest rates.  
 
An important project is the development of a new Bankruptcy Law. The judiciary 
bankruptcy system and corporations' ability to recover need to be improved to preserve the 
firms value and provide a fast reallocation of resources in the economy. Currently, the 
bankruptcy process takes too long and creditors are hardly ever compensated. Creditors' 
agreements are a rigid and inflexible and the judicial system does not support informal 






                                                




Supervision and Capital Requirements 
 
The BCB has been able to adapt several – previously less than effective – 
regulations and supervisory practices, to the 25 Basle Core Principles, which emphasized 
strict enforcement of rules on transparency and financial soundness. Since 1995, the BCB 
has assessed bank capital adequacy on the basis of a Basle-type risk-weighted ratio. In May 
1997, minimum capital was increased from 8 to 10 percent; and in November 1997, the 
ratio was further raised to 11 percent. In Brazil, only tier-one shareholders’ equity, plus 
revaluation reserves, counts towards meeting minimum capital requirements. Depending on 
the specific bank’s capital profile, this condition actually makes Brazil’s current capital 
adequacy ratio much tighter, equivalent to around 13-15 percent under the Basle rules. The 
capital requirements covering counterpart credit risks from banks’ derivatives transactions 
are also more stringent than recommended by the Basle principles. 
 
In parallel to rules on capital adequacy, other mechanisms have been created to 
enhance the supervisory capacity of the BCB. Banks have to submit quarterly consolidated 
accounts to the supervisory authority. There are still differences between accounting 
principles in Brazil and International Accounting Standards, which influence banks’ 
reporting performance, such as reporting of tax credit and rules for the consolidation of 
certain types of subsidiaries. Regulations are being developed to ensure full conformity of 
banks’ accounting practices with international standards, as well as to assist in the 
management of liquidity risk. 
 
In 1998, the BCB adopted an important measure setting forth that financial 
institutions should present an implementation program for internal control systems in 
accordance with, and in some case more stringent, than the Basle core principles. Capital 
requirements to cover market risk, which includes both foreign exchange exposure and 
interest rate risk, were introduced in 2000. Also in 2000, the BCB created a new department 
to increase routine monitoring of individual banks on the basis of quantitative financial 
indicators (indirect supervision).  




Progress has also been made in developing (i) new regulations on a forward-looking 
loan classification and provisioning system; and (ii) new prudential regulations for foreign 
exchange and market risk. The new loan classification system was integrated with the risk 
bureau.  
 
The new regulation for loan classification and provisioning classifies loans 
according to borrower’s ability to repay and places special emphasis on the payment status, 
the borrower’s financial factors (e.g., cash flow guarantees, collateral) and the evaluation of 
the borrower by other banks in the BCB’s credit risk bureau. It includes controls on the 
rescheduling of loans, which has been a weakness of the past system. 
 
The BCB issued a regulation on July 1, 1999 dealing with foreign exchange risk as 
part of the efforts to upgrade capital regulation to take adequate account of market risk. 
This regulation mandates a progressively higher capital charge, as banks elect to take on 
larger foreign exchange positions. The foreign exchange position is defined to be the sum 
of the net on-balance sheet asset-liability exposure, the notional value of derivatives and the 
delta for option contracts. The BCB is also making progress towards putting in place an 
interest-rate regulation for the trading book that mandates an add-on capital charge based 
on a standardized interest-rate model. In many respects, the standardized model is similar to 
the approach used under the Market Risk Amendment to the Basle Capital Accord.  
 
The BCB formally launched in December 1997 the Global Consolidated Inspection 
(GCI) program for the modernization of its supervision practices. The broad objectives of 
the program are to strengthen the BCB’s supervisory practices, upgrade the skills of its 
human resources, and evolve a strategic vision for the future of the financial system. The 
GCI includes: examination of financial and non-financial activities on a consolidated basis; 
an assessment of controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, both local and foreign; and an 
inspection of branches abroad. The BCB expects that the program will permit a deeper 
understanding of the banks’ lines of business, especially in the non-bank financial sector, 
and generally enhance its evaluation of the banks’ internal procedures for the management 




and treasury and market risk. It has recently been expanded to include the publicly owned 
financial institutions. 
 
An important initiative following the Real Plan was the creation of a mandatory, 
privately funded, deposit insurance scheme (Fundo Garantidor de Créditos) through which 
deposits are guaranteed up to BRL 20,000 (or around US$6,000 at mid-2002 exchange rate) 
for deposits and certain other types of financial assets. It is funded by a contribution of 
0.025 percent levied on the monthly balances of insured accounts. 
 
The Government has also been active in a microeconomic perspective to enhance 
the financial and capital markets with measures to increase savings and a more efficient 
intermediation. The main actions are listed in the appendix. 
 
7. Concluding  Remarks 
 
The financial system in Brazil has adapted to developments in the macroeconomic 
environment and regulatory framework. Since the launching of the Real Plan, the Brazilian 
financial system has experienced a deep process of restructuring. It has evolved in three 
different areas. It has experienced the consolidation of the number of banks, reduced the 
presence of the public sector and increased the participation of foreign banks. The 
government has had a critical role in the process by intervening and, in some cases, closing 
weak institutions, first, to prevent the emergence of systemic crises and, second, to address 
the problem of official banks and their fiscal implications. 
 
One important characteristic of the system has been that (a) the depositors base was 
preserved for financial assets denominated in domestic currency, and (b) the system 
buffered severe shocks. This fact is notable if one considers the high inflation prior to the 
Real Plan and, subsequently, the high volatility of interest rates or exchange rates in Brazil. 
 
Events in Brazil have shown that a healthy and well-developed financial system is 




financial innovations that preserve the real value of assets. These instruments were framed 
to fill the needs of the financial system’s customers, allowing intertemporal smoothing of 
consumption by households and expenditures by firms. The government, in turn, has had a 
fundamental role in providing the necessary mix of debt instruments for the financial 
system to design its products. This arrangement has benefited the government by enabling 
it to finance its debts domestically even in extremely turbulent periods.  
 
Although financial institutions have been efficient in preserving the value of 
financial assets, they have been struggling to perform the role of intermediating savings for 
investment. Macro and microeconomic factors, as reflected in high bank spreads and low 
credit to the private sector, have been constraints for the financial sector to provide longer-
term loans. As compared to the average of upper middle-income countries, the volume of 
credit to GDP has been relatively small in Brazil. Firms have relied on self-financing, or on 
long-term credits from official agencies.  
 
A more stable macroeconomic environment and efforts at the microeconomic level 
have improved somewhat the functioning of the financial system. The volume of free, 
market-based credit has increased. Bank spreads, though still large, have narrowed recently. 
But, undoubtedly, much needs to be done to allow the financial system to fully play its 
intermediation role.  
 
A fundamental point is to further the progress achieved so far to build an 
appropriate environment to enable the lengthening of maturities in the financial system, and 
attract domestic funds currently invested elsewhere, outside the domestic financial system, 
in less efficient way for improving the country’s welfare. For a better functioning of the 
financial system, further work is required to achieve: (a) stable macroeconomic conditions 
to create a more predictable environment for the decision making of firms and households; 
(b) a financial system that intermediates funds efficiently; and (c) an institutional 





Improved investor risk perceptions would lead to a more stable and cheaper longer-
term source of funds, causing credit to the private sector to increase. In any event, the 
expansion of bank credit to the private sector needs to be carried gradually, while 
appropriate safeguards to preserve the health of the system are being built. Having this 
objective in mind, the BCB has reinforced supervision and the regulatory framework with 
several actions. Since 1999, the BCB has also been engaged in taking measures to reduce 
banking spreads, especially those related to microeconomic factors. In addition, for a 
sustainable reduction in the costs of financing and more room to expand credit to the 
private sector, fiscal discipline needs to be preserved. A favorable shift in domestic and 
external investors’ risk perceptions regarding the implementation of sound macroeconomic 
policies would result in lower risk premiums.  
 
A reduction in the current constraints on the development of the financial system 
would foster economic growth. This will require persevering in the effort to preserve 
macroeconomic stability and to improve the microeconomic framework by building a 
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A. Recent Measures Adopted for Brazilian Financial Markets (See Ministry of 
Finance of Brazil, 2002) 
 
Credit market 
•  New legislation to constitute finance companies for small business 
•  New credit instruments for agricultural sector to enhance liquidity and safety 
•  More flexibility in credit transfers from financial institutions to special securitization 
companies 
•  Investment funds for receivables 
•  Credit derivatives to hedge return rate 




•  New corporate law that among other measures strengthened the minority shareholders 
rights, improved transparency and enhanced supervision 
•  Strengthening of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) by 
providing for more autonomy and fixed mandate to its Board 
•  Brazilian Depositary Receipts or certificate of deposit held by resident institution 
backed by shares of a foreign-based corporation  
•  New legislation that sets mutual funds with foreign resources to be invested in nascent 
businesses 
•  Stock exchange transactions were exempted from CPMF  
 
Actions to deepen financial and capital markets  
•  Opening of accounts and transactions with banks exclusively through electronic means 
•  Measures to promote the broadening of banking correspondent network 
•  Pulverized sales of Petrobrás and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce shares 
•  Sales of National Treasury securities by internet 




B. Bankruptcy Legislation Reform 
 
Aiming to aggregate alternatives and suggestions to reform the Brazilian bankruptcy 
system, since the second semester of last year, the Research Department of Central Bank of 
Brazil has been studying the Brazilian bankruptcy legislation and the proposals for its 
reform. The analysis began in September 2001 after some critical thoughts held with the 
help of Brazilian specialists gathered in a workshop, under the coordination of the Central 
Bank and the participation of the Ministry of Finance. Afterwards, the issue was also 
debated with national and foreign experts in an international seminar held in November 
2001 at the Central Bank facilities. 
 
This text aims to highlight the need of revision of the Brazilian bankruptcy system, 
which is based in the Decree-Law 7661, of June 21, 1945. The judiciary system of 
bankruptcy and companies' recovery in Brazil, besides being outmoded, presents some 
defects that make it difficult to reach a quick and efficient solution for the bankruptcy 
process, practically eliminating the possibility of recovery of companies facing problems 
and the preservation of their productive units.  
 
An efficient bankruptcy and companies' recuperation system is considered 
fundamental to increase the productivity and the economy stability, reducing risks and costs 
of all economic agents. Thus, the reform of the bankruptcy legislation is one of the 
government priorities, in special Central Bank’s, in order to increase the stability of the 
financial system, to reduce the banking risks and, as a consequence, to contribute to 
diminish the interest rate and the banking spread and to increase the credit offer.  
 
A good bankruptcy law should arrange its rules and procedures to be compatible 
with the country economic and juridical organization, reflecting the values and priorities of 
its time. The current Brazilian bankruptcy system (Decree-Law 7661, of June 21, 1945) met 
properly the country when it was enacted. Today, due to the deep cultural and economic 
changes the country has passed through, together with several changes in the civil, labor 
and tributary legislations, the current bankruptcy system does not meet the Brazilian 




The bankruptcy processes in Brazil are excessively delayed and without adequate 
participation and supervision of the interested creditors, resulting in the deterioration of the 
failed company's assets and in big losses for the creditors. The companies' salvation and the 
preservation of the productive units are almost impracticable under our legal system. The 
only instrument with this goal (the arrangement) is very severe and has no flexibility to 
promote the companies' effective recovery. Besides, the tributary legislation rules in 
relation to the succession of the obligations of the commercial institutions, commercial 
funds and goods of companies facing problems, practically eliminate the possibility of their 
productive units sale, harming much more the creditors and turning companies' recovery 
even more difficult. 
 
Since 1983 the Draft Bill 4376/93 is in course at the House of Representatives, 
proposed by the Executive Power, which regulates the “recovery and liquidation of legal 
entities and individual debtors carrying out economic activities”. The deputy Oswaldo 
Biolchi (PMDB/RS) was the relator of this project, which has already been approved by the 
Special Commission and should be submitted to the House Court (Global Agglutinative 
Sub-amendment after the Court Amendments to the Substitutive Adopted by the Special 
Commission, as of 6.6.2000).  
 
The project modernizes the bankruptcy legislation, innovating many aspects, aiming 
to worth the productive companies and to maintain jobs. As a conception, without hurting 
the tradition and the Brazilian juridical organization, the project practically adopts a unitary 
system, similar to the one current in German law and in implementation in the European 
Union. The company facing financial problems, after having its situation recognized by the 
Judiciary Power, may have its economic viability analyzed through the presentation of a 
recovery plan. In the case the creditors accept this plan, the judge approves the judicial 
recovery process; otherwise, the bankrupt is determined.  
 
There are many positive aspects of the new legislation to be approved in the House 
of Representatives. The main ones are the broadening and flexibility added to the judicial 




financial difficulties of the debtor company. Another positive point of the new law is the 
priority that it gives to the sale of the assets of the bankrupt company, with unmistakable 
advantages to the whole society and to the creditors. The immediate selling of the 
productive units of the bankrupt is a target sought by the society, since it allows the use of 
the bankrupt's productive resources, maintaining the production and protecting jobs.  
 
Despite these important improvements, on the economic hand, the Draft Bill 
4376/93 does not properly solve some of the serious problems that constitute the core of the 
failure of the current Brazilian bankruptcy system. First, because it does not assure the 
participation and supervision of the creditors during the bankruptcy, which is mostly 
associated to the priority given to the fiscal and labour credits. Second, because it does not 
follow the international practice of stimulating the negotiations among the parts as a mean 
to the companies' recovery. Third, because it does not solve the difficulties to sell the assets 
of both bankrupt companies and companies having troubles, since the bureaucracy involved 
is still excessive and the value of the real estate and facilities continues to be depreciated 
due to the problem of obligations' succession. 
 
For this reason, the Banco Central do Brasil recently presented a set of suggestions 
to amend the (Global Agglutinative Sub-amendment after the Court Amendments to the 
Substitutive Adopted by the Special Commission, of the Draft Bill 4376/93. Amongst the 
suggestions to the Draft Bill in course in the House of Representatives, one can highlight: 
 
a)  Extension also to bankruptcy of the limit of R$30,000 as a privilege to the 
labour credits in the judicial recovery, maintaining the fair protection to great part of the 
employees in the case of bankruptcy, but prohibiting high level executives and people 
linked to the bankrupt company owners from having the same privilege of being afforded 
before other creditors. Besides being a frequently mechanism used to result in collusions 
and frauds, the current unlimited priority given to labour credits is one of the main reasons 
for the distance between sundry creditors and the supervision of the bankruptcy process;  
b)  Prevision of formal approval of the judicial recovery plan by the creditors, 




judicial decision regarding the decree of the judicial recovery or bankruptcy, turning the 
judicial recovery into a transparent deal with the creditors, which is the interested part with 
the best conditions to evaluate the economic viability of the proposed recovery plan; 
c)  Creation of the extra-judicial recovery, allowing that agreements freely 
negotiated between the debtor and the creditors be approved by the Judicial Power; and 
d)  More specific rules and a larger range of options for the sale of the bankrupt 
company assets, besides the traditional auction, improving the necessary efficiency and 
agility for the sale.  
 
  Such changes are not the whole set of modifications that are necessary to 
give more efficiency to our bankruptcy process, and fiscal legislation must be altered 
subsequently, including the National Tributary Code (Law 5172/66), in discussion in 
Central Bank and in the Ministry of Finance.   57
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